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Abstract
Delusions are deeply evidence-resistant. Patients with delusions are unmoved
by evidence that is in direct conflict with the delusion, often responding to such
evidence by offering obvious, and strange, confabulations. As a consequence,
the standard view is that delusions are not evidence-responsive. This claim has
been used as a key argumentative wedge in debates on the nature of delusions.
Some have taken delusions to be beliefs and argued that this implies that be-
lief is not constitutively evidence-responsive. Others hold fixed the evidence-
responsiveness of belief and take this to show that delusions cannot be beliefs.
Against this common assumption, I appeal to a large range of empirical evidence
to argue that delusions are evidence-responsive in the sense that subjects have
the capacity to respond to evidence on their delusion in rationally permissible
ways. The extreme evidence-resistance of delusions is a consequence of powerful
masking factors on these capacities, such as strange perceptual experiences, moti-
vational factors, and cognitive biases. This viewmakes room for holding both that
belief is constitutively evidence-responsive and that delusions are beliefs, and it
has important implications for the study and treatment of delusions.
1 Introduction
Delusions are deeply evidence-resistant. Consider, for example, EsméWeijunWang’s
first-personal description of Cotard delusion:
“In the beginning of my own experience with Cotard’s delusion, I woke
my husband before sunup…“I’m dead,” I said, “and you’re dead, and
Daphne [the dog] is dead, but now I get to do it over. Don’t you see?
I have a second chance. I can do better now.” C. said, gently, “I think
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you’re alive.” But this statement, of course, meant nothing. It was his
opinion, and I had my solid belief. I can state that the sky is green, but
will you see it as such? (Wang 2019, 148)¹
Deep evidence-resistance is close to being definitional of delusions. The Diagnostic
and Statistics Manual of the American Psychiatric Association defines delusions as
“not amenable to change in light of conflicting evidence” (Association 2013). Patients
with delusions are unmoved by evidence that is in direct conflict with the delusion,
often responding to such evidence by offering obvious, and strange, confabulations.
As a consequence, the standard view is that delusions are intractable, that is, not
evidence-responsive. This claim has been used as a key argumentative wedge in de-
bates on the nature of delusions. Some have taken delusions to be beliefs and argued
that this implies that belief is not constitutively evidence-responsive. Others hold
fixed the evidence-responsiveness of belief and take this to show that delusions can-
not be beliefs (§2).
Against this shared assumption, I appeal to a large range of empirical evidence
to argue that delusions are evidence-responsive in the sense that subjects have the
capacity to adjust their take on the content of the delusion in rationally permissible
ways in response to relevant evidence (§3). This makes room for holding both that
belief is constitutively evidence-responsive and that delusions are beliefs, and it has
important implications for the study and treatment of delusions and of people with
delusions (§4.1).
2 The Intractability Assumption
When a person has a delusion, they seem to lose their grip on reality. They make
claims such as “I am dead” (the Cotard delusion (Cotard 1880, Young and Leafhead
1996)), “My partner has been replaced by an impostor” (the Capgras delusion (Cap-
gras and Reboul-Lachaux 1994, Pandis et al. 2019)), “Someone else’s thoughts are be-
ing inserted intomymind” (the thought insertion delusion (Mullins and Spence 2003)).
Even when delusions have fairly mundane content—“My partner is cheating on me,”
(Othello syndrome (Todd and Dewhurst 1955)), “People have it out for me” (persecu-
tory delusion (Freeman 2007)) or “That person is in love with me” (erotomania (Jordan
and Howe 1980))—they share the same feature of appearing disconnected from the
available evidence.
More specifically, delusions exhibit extreme evidence-resistance. As the DSM 5
notes, delusions “are not amenable to change in light of conflicting evidence” (Asso-
ciation 2013).² Patients maintain their delusions despite being surrounded by strong
1. Wang mostly discusses her experiences with the Capgras and Cotard delusion, which are fairly unusual.
These delusions arose, in her case, in the context of schizoaffective disorder, which is a diagnosis often
accompanied by a wide range of (common and unusual) delusions.
2. The DSM’s definition of delusion has been subject to vigorous criticism, both for failing to distinguish
delusions from non-delusional beliefs and for wrongly excluding some delusions from the category (Bor-
tolotti 2018, Coltheart 2007). But few contest the claim that deep evidence-resistance is at least present
in the vast majority of delusions.
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counter-evidence to them and tend to hold on to their delusions with tenacity, reject-
ing, dismissing, or explaining away what looks like decisive counter-evidence.
The ways in which people with delusions interact with counter-evidence to their
delusions can look deeply puzzling. For example, consider the patient who claimed
that his hand belonged to his doctor and who answered, “Ever see a man with three
hands?” with: “A hand is the extremity of an arm. Since you have three arms it follows
that you must have three hands.”(Bisiach 1988, 469). Or consider the patient who held
on to her delusion that an acquaintance was in love with her even after he told her
on the phone that, not only was he not in love with her, but in fact could barely
remember who she was (Jordan and Howe 1980). Patients might receive counter-
evidence as one would take up “a bedtime story” (Wang 2019, 158). They may claim
to be an exception to all known facts: since one is dead, feeling one’s heartbeat and
other physical sensations is not evidence that one is alive, in just this one special case
(Young and Leafhead 1996, 158). They may recognize that what they are claiming is
“unbelievable,” and have the sense that “something is not quite right” when they make
delusional claims while holding on to them nonetheless (Alexander et al. 1979, 335).
The evidence-resistance of delusions is so extreme, and so puzzling, that it has led
many to doubt whether delusions are beliefs. It is hard to make sense of attitudes that
are so deeply evidence-resistant as aiming at the truth, or as hooked to a shared reality
that they seek to represent, as beliefs are standardly taken to be. As Andy Egan puts it,
“If we think that a certain sort of evidence responsiveness is essential to belief, then,
in many cases, we’ll be reluctant to say that delusional subjects genuinely believe the
contents of their delusions” (Egan 2008, 266). We can summarize this argument as
follows:
The Anti-Doxasticism Argument
1. The Evidence-Responsiveness View of Belief: Belief is constitutively evidence-
responsive.
2. Intractability: Delusions are not evidence-responsive.³
3. Anti-Doxasticism: Therefore, delusions are not beliefs.⁴
The Evidence-Responsiveness View of Belief is the orthodox view.⁵ It helps make
good on the epistemic role of belief as an attitude that aims at truth (Williams 1970,
Velleman 2000) and is constitutively subject to epistemic standards (Burge 2010). If
delusions do not meet the evidence-responsiveness benchmark, the anti-doxasticist
holds, they cannot be beliefs, and therefore have some other non-doxastic status. Per-
haps patients’ utterances are empty speech acts (Berrios 1991). Or maybe delusions
are attitudes of some different type: imaginings (Currie and Ravenscroft 2002), ac-
ceptances (Frankish 2012, Dub 2017), hybrids between belief and desire or belief and
imagination (Egan 2008), or attitudes towards mental states (Stephens and Graham
2004).
3. I owe the term “intractable” to Reimer (2010).
4. Bortolotti and Miyazono (2015) helpfully center this argument in discussing the philosophical literature
on belief.
5. See Helton (forthcoming) for illuminating discussion.
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But one person’s modus ponens is another’s modus tollens. If one accepts the stan-
dard, DSM-endorsed view that delusions are beliefs, their evidence-resistance prima
facie puts pressure on the idea that beliefs are constitutively evidence-responsive.
From this perspective, we get the following argument:
The Anti-Responsiveness Argument
1. Doxasticism: Delusions are beliefs.
2. Intractability: Delusions are not evidence-responsive.
3. Anti-Responsiveness: Therefore, belief is not constitutively evidence-
responsive.
In a series of influential works, Lisa Bortolotti has forcefully pushed this argument
(Bortolotti 2005a, Bortolotti 2005b, Bortolotti 2009). Other defenders of the doxastic
conception of delusions (Bayne and Pacherie 2005, Reimer 2010) also “deny that there
is a constitutive connection between belief and evidence” (Bayne and Pacherie 2005,
183).
Doxasticists offer compelling reasons to hold that delusions are beliefs, in addi-
tion to the fact that delusions are both intuitively and in clinical practice classified as
beliefs.⁶
Delusions appear to be continuous with ordinary believing, which makes it un-
natural to think that they are an entirely different kind of attitude. Run-of-the-mill
non-delusional beliefs (for example, political and ideological beliefs, and beliefs that
play an important role in justifying one’s habits or practices) can also be deeply
evidence-resistant. And there are plenty of borderline cases between stubborn, but
non-delusional, beliefs on the one hand and delusions on the other. For example, how
should we classify the belief that Hillary Clinton and prominent democrats run a pe-
dophile ring (LaFrance 2020), among other conspiracist beliefs? Such beliefs seem
as deeply disconnected from shared reality as many clinical delusions, yet its propo-
nents are not held to be delusional in the clinical sense. The doxastic view elegantly
accounts for the continuity between delusions and ordinary beliefs.
Additionally, doxastic views have explanatory power: they account for the fact
that we can often interpret subjects’ delusion-related behavior by ascribing beliefs.
This is most salient in cases where delusions lead to deeply disconcerting behavior,
such as stalking someone the patient believes to be in love with them, or attacking
a partner who they believe to be an impostor (as 18% of the 260 Capgras patients in
Foerstl et al. (1991)’s review did). But belief ascriptions also have explanatory power
when the delusion does not lead to extreme content-congruent behavior: they explain
assertions of the content of their delusion, distress and difficulties with coping, and
confabulations in response to evidence. The large majority of patients with delusions
who are admitted to a psychiatric institution behave in some ways that ascribing a
6. Note that one can accept doxasticism without holding that a full theory of delusions will be limited
to studying delusional beliefs. As phenomenological approaches note, a full understanding of delusions
involves understanding the subjective experience of delusions, which in turn may require studying more
pervasive changes in the patient’s experience of, and perspective on, the world. See Bovet and Parnas
(1993), Sass (1994), Sass et al. (2011), Sass and Pienkos (2013) for more on such approaches.
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belief in the delusion helps explain (Wessely et al. 1993), supporting the claim that
delusions are beliefs.
The debate appears to be at a standstill. At play are two different conceptions of
belief and delusions. Doxasticists sever traditionally-held connections between belief
and evidence-responsiveness so as to hold the attractive view that delusions are beliefs.
Anti-Doxasticists reject that view so as to protect the orthodox connection between
belief and evidence-responsiveness. ⁷
Despite these deep disagreements, both sides agree on one thing: the intractability
assumption, that is, the claim that delusions are not evidence-responsive. And both
the Anti-Responsiveness and Anti-Doxasticism arguments rely crucially on this claim.
As we have seen, this claim is prima facie very plausible: it explains delusion main-
tenance in the face of counter-evidence and the strangeness of patients’ reactions to
such evidence. Plausible as it may be, I will argue that we ought to reject it. Though
delusions are evidence-resistant, they are not intractable.
3 Delusions Are Evidence-Responsive
In this section, I will argue against the view that delusions are intractable. Specifically,
I will argue that delusions are evidence-responsive in the sense that subjects have the
capacity to rationally respond to evidence bearing on the content of their delusion.
At the same time, delusions are not exclusively regulated in response to evidence;
motivational and affective factors (among others) are also involved. This explains
why delusions are evidence-resistant, i.e. often maintained in the face of seemingly
decisive counter-evidence.⁸
Tomake the case for this view, I will start by outlining some key facts aboutmental
capacities in general, and capacities to rationally respond to evidence in particular
(§3.1). This will yield criteria for the possession of such capacities and put me in a
position to argue, by appealing to empirical evidence on delusions, that people with
delusions have the relevant capacities (§3.2). I will then explain why, though people
with delusions have such capacities, they so often fail to use them properly, i.e. why
they fail to abandon the delusion in response to counter-evidence (§3.3).
Before starting, an important clarification is in order. I want to argue that all
(or at least the vast majority of) delusions are evidence-responsive. But prima facie
delusions form a highly heterogeneous class. As we have seen, their content can vary
widely, from bizarre claims (“I am dead”) to completely ordinary ones (“My partner
7. There are parallel debates about other candidate constitutive features of belief, such as inferential inte-
gration, action guidance, and reason-giving. On one side, doxasticists use delusions to argue that these
are not constitutive features of belief; on the other side, defenders of traditional conceptions of belief
appeal to these features to argue that delusions are not beliefs. Discussing these debates is beyond the
scope of this paper. See Bortolotti and Miyazono (2015) and Bortolotti (2018) for overviews.
8. Gerrans (2001) argues for the related view that delusions are performance failures of the subject’s capac-
ity for pragmatic rationality, i.e. the ability to apply rules of rationality in context. In his view, subjects
with delusions have a capacity for pragmatic rationality, and just fail to apply it in a wide range of cir-
cumstances. Though this is similar to my view, we are concerned with different capacities: the capacity
to respond to evidence, in my case, and the capacity to apply rules of reasoning in context, in his. Further,
I am not equating delusions with failures to exercise such capacities, as Gerrans does. Instead, I explain
why delusions are evidence-resistant in terms of masking factors on the subject’s capacities.
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is cheating on me”). Delusions also differ in their effects on action, affect, and the
subject’s overall vision of the world. While some delusions lead subjects to act out,
sometimes in extreme ways (consider the Capgras patient who, taking his father to
have been replaced by a robot, decapitated him to find the batteries (Blount 1986, Silva
et al. 1989)), many are more behaviorally circumscribed, with the subject continuing
their life more-or-less as before despite their delusional claims. At the inferential
level, some delusions have a reduced effect on the subject’s other beliefs, while others
are elaborated into florid delusional theories (Davies and Coltheart 2000). Finally,
delusions are highly heterogeneous in their accompanying psychiatric diagnosis: they
appear in cases of schizophrenia (Coltheart 2007), localized brain damage (Young et al.
1992, Ellis and Lewis 2001), or dementia (Flynn et al. 1991), among other diagnoses,
or even no psychiatric diagnosis (Freeman 2006). And this matters to features of the
delusion. Delusions in the context of schizophrenia and related disorders tend to be
polythematic and elaborated, that is, they tend to cover multiple interrelated themes
and have more noticeable effects on inference, affect, and action, whereas delusions
arising after localized brain damage tend to be monothematic and circumscribed, that
is, focused on a single theme and comparatively insulated from the rest of the patient’s
cognition, affect, and action (Davies and Coltheart 2000).
Given such heterogeneity, onemay doubtwhether delusions are all in the province
of the same cognitive mechanisms. If they are not, then one cannot (for example)
generalize from studies about delusions in schizophrenia to claims about delusions
in the context of localized brain damage, or perhaps even from claims about Capgras
delusion to claims about Cotard delusion.
I am not in a position to decisively refute the possibility that different delusions
are in the province of radically different cognitive mechanisms, or to consider the
whole range of variation within the category of delusions. That said, we should not
overstate the threat of heterogeneity. There are compelling models of delusions that
propose that they are in the province of the same range of cognitive mechanisms
(Appelbaum et al. 1999, Bell et al. 2008) while allowing for variation in the weights
assigned to different factors. Indeed, the framework I will articulate for explaining
delusion maintenance in the face of counter-evidence is of this sort.
To vindicate the claim that all or the vast majority of delusions are evidence-
responsive, I will present data supporting the evidence-responsiveness of delusions
with a range of different contents, degrees, and kinds of circumscription, and in the
context of different diagnoses. This suffices to make an inductive case for the claim
that all (or at least the vast majority of) delusions are evidence-responsive, though, of
course, such a case would be bolstered by further research on a wide range of delu-
sions.⁹
3.1 The capacity to respond to evidence
I will argue that delusions are evidence-responsive in the following sense:
Evidence-Responsiveness: 𝑆’s attitude towards 𝑝 is evidence-responsive
just in case 𝑆 has the capacity to rationally respond to evidence bearing
9. Thanks to an anonymous referee for pressing me to clarify the scope of my claim.
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on 𝑝.
In this sub-section, I will put forward key facts about the nature of capacities to ratio-
nally respond to evidence. This will put me in a position to explore whether people
with delusions have such capacities with respect to their delusions.
Rationally responding to evidence consists in changing one’s attitude in epistem-
ically permissible ways when one receives evidence: for example, reducing one’s de-
gree of belief or abandoning a belief when one receives counter-evidence or increas-
ing one’s degree of belief when one receives supporting evidence (to an epistemically
permissible extent). I will here remain neutral on what the epistemically permissible
responses to evidence are, a subject of considerable disagreement in epistemology.
In the case of many delusions, there is a broad consensus that many patients’
responses are not epistemically permissible: patients often fail to respond to counter-
evidence to their delusions in epistemically permissible ways. For example, there is
wide agreement that one ought to abandon, or at least become less certain in, the
claim that one’s partner was replaced by an impostor when given evidence that the
impostor looks exactly like their partner and can remember many shared life experi-
ences, which Capgras patients often fail to do. It is on the basis of the claim that many
of patients’ responses to counter-evidence on their delusion are not epistemically per-
missible that we claim that delusions are evidence-resistant.
I will grant the standard view of what the epistemically permissible responses are
in these cases, that is, I will grant that patients often respond in ways that are not epis-
temically permissible. This is a concessive move to proponents of the intractability
view. If one were to claim that patients’ interactions with seeming counter-evidence
are epistemically permissible, it would follow trivially that delusions are evidence-
responsive. In fact, they would count as evidence-responsive in the strong sense that
patients actually appropriately respond to relevant evidence when they have such ev-
idence.
For the purposes of this paper, I will adopt a factive conception of evidence
(Williamson 2002). On this conception, one’s non-factive mental states (i.e. mere
appearances) do not count as evidence. In other words, I will show that subjects
with delusions have the capacity to respond to factive counter-evidence on their
delusions. This is also a concessive move to the intractability view. Patients with
delusions receive strange perceptual input, which plays a role in causally explaining
their delusions (as I will discuss in §3.3). It is therefore widely agreed (though rarely
emphasized) that patients with delusions have the capacity to respond to non-factive
evidence. Showing that they have the capacity to respond to factive evidence bearing
on their delusions is more challenging. It is also more relevant to the debate about
whether delusions are beliefs: the capacity to respond to non-factive evidence does
not suffice to hook the delusion to shared reality, and therefore is not especially
relevant to whether delusions are beliefs.
So far, I have elucidated what rationally responding to evidence bearing on 𝑝 in-
volves. I will now focus on the most important element of this conception of evidence-
responsiveness: the appeal to capacities.
I will start with some general facts about what having a capacity involves.¹⁰ Hav-
10. My discussion here draws heavily on Schellenberg (2018)’s discussion of capacities.
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ing the capacity toΦ does not imply that oneΦs whenever one engages in the relevant
activity, or whenever one tries to Φ. For example, having the capacity to run 10k in
under 40 minutes does not imply that one always runs at that pace, and having the
capacity to score a goal does not mean that every shot at the goal goes in. Indeed,
as these examples illustrate, having a capacity does not even require one to succeed
reliably, i.e. most of the time that one exercises that capacity.
Instead, having the capacity to Φ involves successfully Φ-ing in specific conditions
that suit that capacity. For example, what matters to whether one has the capacity to
run a 40-minute 10k is whether one does so when exerting serious effort, not injured,
well-rested, highly motivated, and so on—even if one would fail to do so if a single
one of these conditions is not met. Having the capacity to Φ is a matter of satisfying
counterfactuals of the form “If special conditions 𝐶 were in place, then the subject
would successfully Φ”.
Applying these points to the capacity to rationally respond to evidence 𝑒, we can
conclude that having that capacity does not require always responding to 𝑒 when one
has that evidence. Instead, having the capacity to respond to 𝑒 involves satisfying
the following counterfactual: if one were to receive evidence 𝑒 in some set of special
conditions, one would respond to 𝑒 in an epistemically permissible way.
What are those special conditions? We are here dealing with a mental capacity:
one which operates on mental states, and whose successful exercise consists in yield-
ing a new set of mental states. As such, one would expect that factors internal to
one’s cognitive system could interfere with the successful exercise of such a capacity.
For this reason, the special conditions in which one will rationally respond to evi-
dence require the right sort of internal environment, one without internal tampering
factors. Salient candidates for such tampering include exhaustion, cognitive biases,
motivational factors such as the desire to hang on to a belief that is central to one’s
identity, and affective factors that cloud one’s judgment. The special conditions un-
der which someone who has the capacity to rationally respond to evidence 𝑒 would
actually do so are ones where such interfering mental factors are absent. Importantly,
these conditions may routinely fail to be met in the actual world. The subject may be
too tired or overwhelmed most of the time, or their motivational structure may make
them hold extremely tightly to some of their beliefs.
The central upshot is the following: an attitude can both be evidence-responsive in
the sense that the subject has the capacity to rationally respond to evidence bearing on
its content, and evidence-resistant in the sense that the subject does not change their
mind most of the time they receive counter-evidence. That will be the case whenever,
for a given individual and attitude, the right conditions for the exercise of the capacity
rarely occur in the actual world.
I will argue that this is precisely what we find with delusions: patients with delu-
sions have the capacity to rationally respond to counter-evidence to their delusion but
are rarely in the right (internal) conditions to respond to it. To do so, I will, in §3.2,
appeal to empirical evidence to argue that subjects with delusions would appropri-
ately change their mind in response to evidence bearing on the delusion in a range of
conditions, and, in §3.3, explain—by appeal to factors that interfere with the exercise
of such capacities—why they fail to rationally respond to counter-evidence in many
real-world circumstances.
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3.2 In support of the presence of evidence-responsiveness capaci-
ties in delusions
In this sub-section, I will give reasons in favor of thinking that subjects have the
capacity to rationally respond to evidence bearing on the content of their delusion. My
focus will be on showing that that have the capacity to respond to counter-evidence.
Their capacity to respond to supporting evidence is not commonly questioned.
3.2.1 Characteristic interactions with counter-evidence
As discussed in §2, much of the case for the intractability of delusions is based on pa-
tients’ puzzling responses to evidence. I will now argue that these puzzling responses
do not indicate the lack of the capacity to rationally respond to such evidence; in fact,
they offer moderate support to the claim that patients have that capacity.
First, note that patients do not dismiss the evidence, but incorporate it, that is, make
efforts to inferentially integrate the evidence with their delusion and background be-
liefs (Garety et al. 2001). This is often occluded in the philosophical literature on the
topic, which highlights the fact that patients hold on to their delusion with tenacity
while omitting or minimizing the fact that patients make efforts to accommodate the
evidence.
Efforts to accommodate evidence can take different forms. Patients may state that
they are an exception to generalizations, bite the bullet on implausible conclusions,
or contrive stories that explain away the evidence. This case is illustrative:
We asked her during the period in which she claimed to be dead whether
she could feel her heart beat, whether she could feel hot or cold and
whether she could feel whether her bladder was full. J.K. said that since
she had such feelings even though she was dead they clearly did not rep-
resent evidence that she was alive. She said she recognised this was a dif-
ficult concept for us to grasp and one which was equally difficult for her
to explain, partly because the experience was unique to her and partly
because she could not fully understand it herself. We then asked J.K.
whether she thought we would be able to feel our hearts beat, to feel
hunger and so on if we were dead. J.K. said that we wouldn’t and that
this experience was unique to her. (Young and Leafhead 1996, 158)¹¹
This patient receives what looks like decisive evidence that she is not dead: her heart is
beating, she can feel hot or cold, she can feel whether her bladder is full. She does not
change her mind in response. But she does engage with the evidence. She recognizes
that, in normal cases, this would entail that a person is dead. But, from her point of
view, she knows that she is dead; so death must look different from usual in her case.
11. This is, of course, just one case. I do not here present data on what fraction of patients with delusions
inferentially integrate the evidence in relevantly similar ways. The role of presenting case studies is to
make vivid why certain kinds of behavior are indicative of the capacity to respond to counter-evidence.
The pervasiveness of those kinds of behavior is a different matter. Thanks to an anonymous referee for
pressing me to articulate the role of case studies in the argument.
9
This pattern of reasoning is recognizable. If you observed, or were told about,
something that looks like a violation of the laws of nature but were certain of what
you saw or heard, you might find yourself reasoning in an analogous way. You know
what you saw (or that someone else saw it), so the laws of nature must have been
violated in that instance. Arguably, belief in miracles is often supported roughly in
these ways. More generally, the ways in which patients integrate counter-evidence
through confabulations are similar to those of ordinary believers when they receive
counter-evidence to cherished beliefs.
Such responses are rationally impermissible (or, at least, I will grant that they are).
The fact that patients integrate counter-evidence with their beliefs in rationally imper-
missible ways does not imply that they have the capacity to integrate such evidence
in rationally permissible ways. However, the similarities between these interactions
with counter-evidence and others we witness in non-delusional cases are suggestive.
To the extent that a capacity to respond to counter-evidence is present in the latter
cases, it is plausible to think it is present in cases of delusion too.¹²
Further, patients often understand how the evidence they receive bears on the
content of their delusions, that is, what the epistemically permissible responses would
be. Here is a striking example:
E: Isn’t that [two families] unusual?
S: It was unbelievable.
E: How do you account for it?
S: I don’t know. I’ve tried to understand it myself and it was virtually
impossible.
S: What if I told you I don’t believe it?
E:That’s perfectly understandable. In fact, when I tell the story, I feel that
I’m concocting a story . . . it’s not quite right, something is wrong.
E: If someone told you the story what would you think?
S: I would find it extremely hard to believe. I should be defending myself.
(Alexander et al. 1979)
This interaction shows that 𝑆 understands how the evidence bears on their delusions,
i.e. what the rationally permissible responses would be. If, as Ryle noted, “execution
and understanding are merely different exercises of knowledge of the tricks of the
same trade” (Ryle 1949, 55), then the same capacity is employed to judge responses
to evidence and to produce such responses. Assuming such a connection between
understanding and execution, the fact that the subject appropriately judges responses
to evidence indicates that they have the capacity to respond appropriately.
A third characteristic aspect of how subjects with delusions interact with counter-
evidence consists in evidence-avoidance, motivated by strong discomfort provoked
12. Thanks to an anonymous referee for pressing me to clarify this point.
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by counter-evidence.¹³ As Esme Weijun Wang writes about her stint with the Cotard
delusion:
Being dead butted up against the so-called evidence of being alive, and so
I grew to avoid that evidence because proof was not a comfort; instead, it
pointed to my insanity. (Wang 2019, 157)
This behavior looks remarkably similar to the evidence-avoidance we find in run-of-
the-mill confirmation bias, i.e. the ordinary tendency to seek out evidence friendly
to one’s current beliefs, and to avoid evidence against those beliefs (Klayman and Ha
1987, Klayman 1995, and Nickerson 1998). For example, how different is it from avoid-
ing AIDS testing when one fears one might test positive (Dawson et al. 2006, Lerman
et al. 2002)? In both cases, the subject avoids gathering evidence where the beliefs
they would end up with, if they revised in accordance with that evidence, would be
unpleasant ones (namely, beliefs that they have a serious illness).
One upshot is that delusion maintenance in the face of available evidence is some-
times a result of the patient failing to gather that evidence, and not of the patient
failing to rationally respond to evidence they have. In other words, once we take into
account evidence-avoidance, fewer instances of evidence-resistance—i.e. of failing to
rationally respond to evidence one has—are left to explain.
Further, this kind of evidence-avoidant behavior is a sign of the capacity to re-
spond to evidence. The reason is the following. Wanting to avoid revising beliefs
one would end up revising if one acquired certain evidence is a good reason to avoid
gathering it. This is sometimes explicitly recognized from a first-person perspective.
For example, in his account of living with (and overcoming) grandiose and paranoid
delusions, Robert Chapman writes that he “was afraid to check with reality for fear
that [his] ideas might be deflated and [his] sense of having a useful and meaningful
direction in pursuing these might be demolished.” (Chapman 2002, 547). In contrast,
if one were not even able to respond to the evidence, gathering it would make no dif-
ference to what one believes. Evidence-avoidance would be puzzling for intractable
attitudes. ¹⁴
13. Though it is hard to get statistics on just how common evidence-avoidance is in delusion patients, empir-
ically well-supported models (e.g.Freeman et al. (2001)’s model, which focuses on persecutory delusions)
ascribe evidence-avoidance a significant role in delusion maintenance. This suggests that it is a pervasive
feature of delusions.
14. Note two complications. First, there is an alternative explanation that is compatible with full evidence-
insensitivity: perhaps subjects avoid gathering evidence because they don’t want to receive evidence
of their own evidence-insensitivity (thanks to Andy Egan for suggesting this alternative explanation).
But this explanation is inferior to the one I propose. It imputes to subjects beliefs about the degree of
evidence-sensitivity of their own beliefs. And it does not match the phenomenology of confirmation bias,
which is one of wanting to avoid being forced into a view one dislikes, or first-personal descriptions like
the ones above. Second, this does not establish that patients have the capacity to respond to evidence to
a rationally permissible extent; perhaps they have the capacity to respond by adjusting to some extent
in the right direction, but not to a rationally permissible extent (thanks to an anonymous referee for
pointing this out). However, it does indicate that counter-evidence can have some substantial effects on
patients, which sits poorly with the intractability assumption. I will shortly discuss some reasons why
patients with delusions may fail to respond to evidence to a sufficient extent, while still adjusting in the
right direction.
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3.2.2 The bias against disconfirming evidence (BADE)
Aproblem for the view that delusions are evidence-responsive is that peoplewith delu-
sions display a bias against counter-evidence (once they have gathered it). In this sub-
section, I will consider studies on this phenomenon and argue that this bias against
counter-evidence is compatible with the capacity to rationally respond to counter-
evidence.
In a series of studies, Todd Woodward and collaborators have shown that peo-
ple with schizophrenia (Moritz and Woodward 2006, Woodward et al. 2008) and with
schizotypal traits (Woodward et al. 2007), who are more likely to experience delu-
sions, display a bias against disconfirming evidence (BADE): they adjust their beliefs
to counter-evidence much less than other subjects.¹⁵ This bias is restricted to strongly
held beliefs (Woodward et al. 2008), but domain-general, that is, not restricted to delu-
sional topics. The authors of these studies hypothesize that a BADE is a contributing
factor to the maintenance of delusions (Woodward et al. 2006).
These findings may seem hard to square with the capacity to rationally respond
to such evidence. Indeed, the authors of these studies describe people with a bias
against disconfirming evidence as “less able to revise false convictions in general”
(Moritz and Woodward 2006, 158) and “generally impaired in their ability to integrate
disconfirmatory evidence” (Woodward et al. 2008, 268) (my italics).
In my view, these are inaccurate descriptions of the implications of these findings.
A bias against disconfirming evidence does not imply lacking the capacity to respond
to such evidence, as I will now argue.
First, given the domain-generality of the bias, and the fact that it is found in the
non-clinical population, if a bias against disconfirming evidence implies lacking the ca-
pacity to respond to such evidence, lacking capacities to respond to counter-evidence
would bewidespread. Peoplewith schizophrenia and schizotypal traits, most of whom
do not have delusions, would lack the capacity to respond to counter-evidence to all
of their strongly held beliefs. This is a very strong, and prima facie implausible, claim.
Further,other facts about how these subjects interact with evidence are hard to
square with lacking the capacity to respond to counter-evidence. They do as well as
other subjects when it comes to responding to supporting evidence. They adjust their
beliefs to some extent—just an insufficient one—in light of disconfirming evidence in
the studies. And, in other contexts, they show a greater tendency to over-adjust to
disconfirmatory evidence (Moritz and Woodward 2005), so that a bias against discon-
firming evidence is only manifest in some contexts. These facts sit awkwardly with
the idea that they lack the capacity to rationally respond to counter-evidence. Instead,
they suggest that these subjects have the capacity to respond to (both supporting and
disconfirming) evidence on their beliefs, where that capacity is masked in some in-
stances in which they receive counter-evidence to strongly held beliefs.
In fact, other work by the same team suggests a plausible explanation for the bias
against disconfirming evidence that does not impute lacking the capacity to respond
to counter-evidence. All of us—subject to this bias or not—are motivated to find ways
of accommodating counter-evidence to our strongly held beliefs without abandoning
them (Gilbert 2006, Cooper 2007, Harmon-Jones and Harmon-Jones 2007). Now, one
15. Thanks for an anonymous referee for bringing these studies to my attention.
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would expect interpersonal and contextual variation in how many ways of accommo-
dating counter-evidence one comes upwith, i.e. in howmany alternative explanations
for that evidence (other than the falsity of one’s cherished beliefs) one constructs. The
more alternative ways of accommodating counter-evidence one can come upwith, the
less that evidence will seem to discredit one’s strongly held beliefs.
We have reason to think that the very same subjects who display a bias against
disconfirming evidence come upwithmoreways of accommodating counter-evidence.
This is because they display a liberal acceptance bias: they tend to give high plausibility
ratings to awide range of alternative views, including views that common sensewould
immediately dismiss (Moritz and Woodward 2004, Moritz and Woodward 2005).¹⁶ ¹⁷
Let’s put these two points together. Like all of us, people who display a bias
against disconfirming evidence are motivated to generate alternative explanations for
that evidence. Due to their liberal acceptance bias, they will accept more of those as
plausible than other members of the population. This leads them to adjust their be-
liefs to counter-evidence less, i.e. to display a bias against disconfirming evidence.
From their perspective, the counter-evidence does not look decisive because it can be
explained away in a wide range of ways.
If this is right, then we have a good explanation for the bias against disconfirming
evidence that is compatible with people with this bias having the capacity to respond
to counter-evidence to strongly held beliefs in rationally permissible ways. People
with a BADE have the capacity to rationally respond to counter-evidence, but it is
masked by (1) their motivation to hold on to those beliefs, which leads to generating
more alternative explanations for the counter-evidence, and (2) a liberal acceptance
bias, which makes them fail to rule out some of those explanations which common
sense would exclude.
More strongly, one may think that, taking into account the wider range of alter-
native explanations they consider, people with a BADE respond rationally to counter-
evidence. Specifically, if one thinks that how confident one should be in a belief in
the face of relevant evidence depends on the space of alternative explanations for that
evidence of which one is aware, then displaying a BADE may be rational given the
wider range of alternative explanations considered.
3.2.3 Delusion remission and cognitive behavioral therapy
So far, we have been looking at how the behavior of people with delusions when they
do not change their mind in prima facie epistemically permissible ways in response
to counter-evidence contains markers of the capacity to respond to evidence. But
16. Onemightworry that this just pushes intractability one step back, to the intractability of these alternative
views: why do they accept views that common sense would immediately dismiss? But liberal acceptance
does not require failing to respond to counter-evidence to these implausible alternatives. More plausibly,
patients simply fail to gather such evidence, in that they may fail to retrieve it from memory and are
likely not to receive such counter-evidence from their environment at the moment of acceptance.
17. These findings cohere with phenomenological descriptions of delusion in schizophrenia, which highlight
disturbances in background or bedrock certainties Rhodes and Gipps (2008), “a change in the totality of
understandable connections”(Jaspers 1963, 97), or “a mutation of the ontological framework of experi-
ence itself”(Sass and Pienkos 2013, 633) as factors in the formation and maintenance of delusions. One
would expect such disturbances to be reflected in accepting options that common sense dismisses.
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patients sometimes abandon their delusions in response to counter-evidence or come
to hold them less strongly. In this section, I will discuss such instances and consider
their significance for whether delusions are evidence-responsive.
First, in some cases, the strength with which a delusion is held wanes in response
to counter-evidence, with the subject eventually abandoning the delusion:
LU was asked whether she had ever seen a dead person before, and if
so how she had known that the person was dead. LU responded that
after her grandmother’s death she had viewed her grandmother, and that
she knew her grandmother was dead because her eyes were closed and
she was motionless. LU acknowledged that the fact that she herself was
moving and talking was inconsistent with the typical characteristics of
dead people, and she subsequently expressed some uncertainty about her
beliefs. Within a week of the initial neuropsychological assessment, her
delusion appeared to have completely resolved. (McKay and Cipolotti
2007, 353)
Giving LU evidence against the claim that she is dead leads her to, first, reduce the
degree to which she felt certain of that claim, and then to abandon it altogether. This
delusion is evidence-responsive: LU actually responds to counter-evidence to the delu-
sion, and therefore trivially has the capacity to do so.
The fact that patients’ confidence in their delusions varies also indicates that pa-
tients have and exercise capacities to rationally respond to counter-evidence. Con-
viction can vary even over the course of one day, with a predictor for reduced confi-
dence being interactions with other people (Myin-Germeys et al. 2001). This may be
because others provide counter-evidence to the delusion, suggesting that people with
delusions are at least sometimes swayed by counter-evidence.¹⁸¹⁹
Further, delusions are typically not chronic conditions: they tend to be eventually
abandoned, at least when they do not arise in the context of neurodegenerative disease.
Once the delusion is in remission, subjects exercise (and therefore have) the capacity
to rationally respond to evidence. It is unlikely that they lose this capacity during the
delusional period and then re-acquire it. In such cases, “it is reasonable to assume
that the neuroanatomical basis of… competence is unimpaired” (Gerrans 2001, 166).
Notably, first-personal descriptions of coming to abandon a delusion often empha-
size the effects of considering counter-evidence. Consider these two cases, the first
one of Capgras delusion remission, and the second one of remission of a range of
persecutory delusions:
I’ve started going through it, and seeing what could possibly happen and
what couldn’t happen. That was wrong, that couldn’t happen. Even
though it has happened it couldn’t. Mary couldn’t suddenly disappear
from the room, so there must be an explanation for it. The lady knows
me way back. She could say things that happened 40 years go, and I
18. This study considers only patients with schizophrenia.
19. As seen in our discussion of the bias against disconfirming evidence, they are typically swayed to a lesser
extent than people without schizophrenia. But, as discussed there, this is no objection to the claim that
they have and exercise the capacity to rationally respond to evidence in such cases.
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wonder where she gets them from. … And then I worked it out and I’ve
wondered if it’s Mary all the time. It’s nobody else. (Turner and Coltheart
2010, 371)
When a delusion is stacked against a conscious awareness of reality and
rationality, the delusion falls apart. While the delusive ideas disintegrate,
their pretense is revealed. I put on my detective cap. I would test out
arguments. I tried to develop the strongest arguments possible against
the falsehoods. I made a list of all the rational alternatives that I could
think of. I looked for evidence for what really was happening and what
really wasn’t happening. I asked myself, ”How do I know this?” Did I
actually see it or just a ”sign” of it? Did I really hear it, or could I have
misinterpreted what I heard? Did I smell, taste, or feel it? Did someone
tell me this? Is most of my evidence beyond my senses or interpretations
of signs and symbols? I tried to test reality in terms of the here and now
transactions with other people rather than assuming what their supposed
intentions were or predicting what would happen.(Chapman 2002, 551)
In cases of remission like these, patients respond to evidence (from their senses, tes-
timony, and memory). Considering counter-evidence leads them to abandon their
delusion. They have the capacity to respond to evidence, and successfully exercise it
to abandon the delusion.
These first-personal descriptions are indicative of the fact that offering counter-
evidence has the potential to make the patient abandon the delusion. This lies behind
the effectiveness of cognitive-behavioral therapy (CBT), which provides a particu-
larly compelling case for the view that delusions are evidence-responsive. Cognitive-
behavioral therapy directly guides the patient toward collecting and assessing evi-
dence bearing on their delusion. It centers on changing patients’ beliefs about events
they have experienced so as to change their responses to those events. More specifi-
cally, it focuses on cognitive restructuring, i.e., on examining and challenging maladap-
tive thought patterns and helping the patient establish more adaptive ones (Dozois
and Dobson 2010, 11) and on reality testing, that is, assessing whether beliefs fit the
evidence and replacing distorted beliefs with more realistic ones (Kendall and Bemis
1983). The second quote on delusion remission above is illustrative of the process
(though, remarkably, the patient himself designed and conducted the process).
Though the philosophical significance of cognitive-behavioral therapy has been in-
sufficiently explored, doxasticists (Bortolotti 2009 and Bayne and Pacherie 2005) have
appealed to it in arguing for the claim that delusions are beliefs. They argue that our
theories of delusion ought to be consistent with best clinical practice, in which “the
therapist treats the delusional patient as a believer of 𝑝, and he or she gently invites
the patient to question whether 𝑝 is the thing that ought to be believed” (Bayne and
Pacherie 2005, 185). Consistency with such practice, they argue, requires classifying
delusions as beliefs, as opposed to claiming that the therapist is mistaken in their
ascription.
Note that such a practice also involves the therapist assuming that the patient has
the capacity to respond to counter-evidence: the therapist assumes that the patient
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can “question whether 𝑝 is the thing that ought to be believed”(Bayne and Pacherie
2005, 185) and abandon their belief that 𝑝 if it is not. By the same token, then, dox-
asticists ought to accept the evidence-responsiveness of delusions. This is significant
because, as we saw in §2, they endorse the intractability assumption.
The effectiveness of cognitive-behavioral therapy can be marshaled in an addi-
tional argument for delusional evidence-responsiveness. Specifically, the best expla-
nation for successful instances of cognitive behavioral therapy involves the target
attitudes being evidence-responsive. Successful CBT requires the patient to correctly
assess the significance of the evidence they receive, and adjust their delusion and
related beliefs accordingly. Properly guided by the therapist, the patient actually re-
sponds to counter-evidence, which establishes that they have the capacity to do so at
that moment. The best explanation for this fact is that they had that capacity before
entering the therapeutic context, but were failing to exercise it properly.²⁰
CBT is effective as a treatment for delusions. Recent meta-analyses concur that
“targeted individualized CBT for delusions and hallucinations is effective” (Lincoln
and Peters 2018; see also Gaag et al. (2014)). These studies cover both delusions in the
context of schizophrenia and other clinical contexts.²¹ They establish that therapeutic
approaches with a “focus on cognitive reframing and reality testing” (Lincoln and
Peters 2018, 67)—i.e., on getting patients to assess the content of the delusion based
on evidence—are effective, exhibiting significant benefits on “subjective strength of
conviction, reactions to and acting on beliefs” (Lincoln and Peters 2018, 67). In other
words, patients have been found to respond to evidence against their delusions by
abandoning or reducing their credence in their delusions.
We have seen that, for cognitive-behavioral therapy to work on an attitude, that
attitude must be evidence-responsive, and that CBT works on many delusions. The
upshot is that many delusions are evidence-responsive.²²
3.3 Explaining delusional evidence-resistance
In the last sub-section, I presented a wide range of reasons to think that delusions
are evidence-responsive. Still, patients hold on to their delusions with a tenacity that
seems hard to understand. They do not employ their capacities to respond to evi-
dence often or easily. This requires explanation: what is keeping them from success-
fully exercising these capacities? Three families of factors are promising candidates
for explaining evidence-resistance in delusions. These are continued strange experi-
ences reinforcing the delusion, motivational factors, and automatic reasoning biases.
20. The alternative is that they acquire this capacity in therapy, but lacked it beforehand. This alternative
implies deep changes to the patient’s cognitive architecture over the course of a small number of therapy
sessions, which is implausible.
21. For reviews that focus specifically on schizophrenia, and establish that CBT is effective in treating delu-
sions in schizophrenia, see Sarin et al. (2011) Wykes et al. (2008) Turkington et al. (2006).
22. This result should not be over-stated. CBT is relatively effective as a treatment for delusions, but this is
in part because delusions are still poorly understood, and, as a result, we lack highly effective treatments.
Indeed, most of the effect sizes found are in the small-to-medium range (Gaag et al. 2014), and there are
many cases of delusions where this treatment does not work at all. That said, when it works, it is in part
because the delusion is evidence-responsive. When it does not, this is likely due to the kinds of factors
I will outline in §3.3.
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In this section, I will show that these factors and their interaction with evidence-
responsiveness capacities can explain a wide range of evidence-resistant behavior in
patients with delusions.
Take strange experiences. Many delusions are formed in response to strange ex-
periences. For example, the best explanation for Capgras delusion (“My partner has
been replaced by an impostor”) formation appeals to a deficit in the visual processing
of faces that is the mirror image of prosopagnosia.²³ In prosopagnosia, people lose
the ability to recognize faces but still experience the affective responses they would
usually have in response to the faces of loved ones, as measured by, for example, skin
conductance tests (Bruce and Young 1986). Conversely, Capgras patients’ facial recog-
nition systems are intact, but they lack the usual affective responses they would have
upon seeing loved ones (Ellis and Young 1990, Ellis and Lewis 2001). This generates
the sense that something is deeply wrong. It appears to the patient that something
has changed in the person, and this needs accounting for. The view that they have
been replaced by an impostor is a response to this abnormal experience.²⁴
Though the strange experience does not suffice to explain delusion formation, it
is widely agreed that it is a crucial causal factor.²⁵ Further, this is not a one-off ex-
perience. It is sustained by cortical damage that does not just go away. As a result,
the patient’s unsettling sense of unfamiliarity when looking at the face of a loved one
is continually reinforced: whenever the Capgras patient looks at their loved one’s
face, they experience the same disturbing lack of affect. They constantly receive ap-
parent evidence that supports their delusion. This comes into conflict with the actual
evidence they get from talking with other people or recalling facts they know. Re-
sponding to that evidence in rationally permissible ways is difficult in the face of
such strange private experiences. In other words, these strange experiences explain
why exercising the capacity to respond to counter-evidence does not result in the
abandonment of the delusion.²⁶
To get a clear sense of the difficulty in abandoning a delusion in such circum-
stances, consider the following case of remission from anosognosia (the delusional
23. This explanation paradigmatically applies to cases of Capgras that occur without a schizophrenia diagno-
sis, but Coltheart et al. (2007) argue that it also extends to such delusions in the context of schizophrenia.
Similar explanations in terms of localized brain damage causing perceptual distortions have also been
explored for other monothematic delusions.
24. This brief explanation omits many points of disagreement about Capgras formation. For example, some
accounts hold that the first step in delusion formation is not a conscious experience but the mere lack of
an autonomic response (Coltheart 2005). And some hold that the patient endorses the experience of seeing
their partner as an impostor (Bayne and Pacherie (2004)), instead of adopting it as an explanation for the
experience that something is off in the interaction (Maher (1999), Stone and Young (1997)). Others still
think that the perceptual effects we find in Capgras are the result of a top-down disturbance (Campbell
(2001): the experience is the result of the delusion, and not the other way around. Which of these views
is correct is an interesting question, but it does not affect the point that delusion formation involves a
strange experience, which is the key point for my purposes.
25. Most theorists agree that there are other factors involved in the formation of the delusion, such as a deficit
in hypothesis evaluation (Coltheart 2007), reasoning biases such as the tendency to jump to conclusions
(Garety and Freeman 1999), a liberal acceptance bias (Moritz and Woodward 2004, Moritz and Wood-
ward 2005), or a bias toward privilege explanatory adequacy (i.e. privileging how well the experience is
explained by the hypothesis over how probable the hypothesis antecedently is (McKay 2012)).
26. See Corlett et al. (2009) for an account of delusion maintenance that emphasizes the role of such rein-
forcement.
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failure to acknowledge illness or impairment (Davies and Davies 2009)):
E: What was the consequence of the stroke?
HS: The left hand here is dead and the left leg was pretty much.
HS: (later): I still feel as if when I am in a room and I have to get up and
go walking… I just feel like I should be able to.
E: You have a belief that you could actually do that?
HS: I do not have a belief, just the exact opposite. I just have the feeling
that sometimes I feel like I can get up and do something and I have to tell
myself ‘no I can’t’. (Chatterjee 1996, 227)
The patient believes that his left leg is paralyzed: he knows he had a stroke that left
him paralyzed on the left side of the body. That said, he still experiences an incli-
nation towards the delusional claim that he can move around as before the stroke.
This inclination seems to partly result from strange, illusory perceptual experiences
of their paralyzed limb moving as intended, where these experiences result from the
impairment of sensation, attention, and motor control (Davies and Davies 2009). It
takes continued suppression and monitoring efforts for the patient not to be taken in
by this powerful feeling. Given this fact, it is not surprising that patients sometimes
temporarily become less certain of their delusion when given evidence against it, but
then return to strongly believing it.
Following the philosophical literature on delusions, I have so far focused on the
role of strange experiences in monothematic delusions that result from localized brain
damage. But the same point applies to delusions characteristic of schizophrenia. They
also appear to be partly formed and sustained by abnormal perceptual experiences.
Due to dopamine deregulation, patients with schizophrenia attribute salience inap-
propriately to internal and external stimuli (Kapur 2003). This results in a strange
experience of the world writ large (as the phenomenological tradition has long recog-
nized), one characterized by a sense of tension and hidden meaning (Fuchs 2005, Sass
and Pienkos 2013). Again, this sense of strangeness and significance is continually re-
inforced in each and every perceptual experience, coming into conflict with evidence
received via testimony or memory.
Strange perceptual experiences, then, are an important factor in explaining why
people with delusions maintain them in the face of counter-evidence, despite having
the capacity to respond to such evidence. That said, not all people with delusions have
such strange experiences (Bell et al. 2008). Such experiences cannot be the only factor
masking evidence-responsiveness capacities.
Motivational factors (such as the desire to hang on to a pleasant delusion or a com-
pelling explanation for one’s strange experiences) are another such factor. The role
of motivational factors in delusion has long been recognized. Indeed, traditional psy-
chodynamic theories of delusion formation held that these were formed exclusively
due to motivational factors. Such theories claim, for example, that delusions of perse-
cution are part of a defense mechanism to avoid attributing negative events to oneself,
and that Capgras delusion arises to make sexual desire for an inappropriate target (e.g.
a parent) acceptable.
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These views do not hold up to scrutiny, given evidence of brain damage, anoma-
lous experiences, and reasoning biases and deficits in delusions. Nonetheless, it re-
mains very plausible that motivational factors play some role in the maintenance of
delusions, helping explain why subjects’ evidence-responsiveness capacities do not
lead to revision in the face of counter-evidence.
This is especially plausible when it comes to delusions with a content that is self-
aggrandizing—such as delusions of grandeur, or erotomania—or simply more positive
than evidence warrants—such as anosognosia or the reverse Othello syndrome (the
delusion that one’s partner continues to be faithful, despite overwhelming evidence
to the contrary). Sophisticated motivational accounts of such delusions have been
developed (e.g. Ramachandran (1996)’s account of anosognosia). Similarly, persecu-
tory delusions seem to be maintained in part because attributing negative events to
external causes allows the patient to avoid negative beliefs about the self (Bentall et al.
2001).
The basic idea here—explored in detail in accounts that see self-deception and
delusion as overlapping—is that holding on to such views supports one’s self-esteem
or self-image, motivating the subject to maintain them.²⁷ This inclines the subject
to process evidence in biased ways, confabulating (Turnbull et al. 2004) and more
generally finding elaborateways of fitting counter-evidence by adjusting some of their
other beliefs.
The role of motivational factors is not restricted to positive delusions. As cogni-
tive dissonance theory (Festinger et al. 1956, Devine 1994, Cooper 2007, Harmon-Jones
and Harmon-Jones 2007) tells us, receiving counter-evidence to our beliefs (positive
or not) has negative valence. We are motivated to alleviate cognitive dissonance by re-
establishing coherence among our beliefs, now including the counter-evidence. How
we do so depends on the centrality of the beliefs under attack: the more central or
strongly held they are, the more likely we are to alleviate dissonance while maintain-
ing those beliefs.
Two facts about delusions, regardless of whether their content is positive, should
make us expect patients to be highly motivated to maintain them. First, delusions pro-
vide an explanation for an unusual experience, without which the patient would feel
at sea in the world.²⁸ Second, in the case of delusions, admitting that one is wrong is
admitting that something has gone seriously amiss with one’s cognition, a conclusion
that would likely ravage one’s self-esteem. For these reasons, as seen in the discus-
sion of the bias against disconfirming evidence above, we should expect patients to
expend significant effort at generating alternative explanations for counter-evidence
to their delusions. In this way, motivational factors would contribute to delusion
maintenance by leading patients to come up with a wide range of ways of accommo-
dating counter-evidence.
Finally, successfully exercising one’s capacity to respond to evidence can be effort-
ful, requiring one to overcome or suppress automatic reasoning biases. Where such
biases are operative, one will fail to rationally respond to evidence, despite having
27. See the essays in Bayne and Fernández (2010) for discussion of the relationship between delusion and
self-deception.
28. Freeman and Garety (2004) argue that this is an important factor in the maintenance of persecutory
delusions.
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the capacity to do so. Reasoning biases function as masks on the subject’s cognitive
capacities: they are “thinking distortions and processing preferences rather than per-
formance deficits and limitations of mental capacity” (Moritz and Woodward 2007,
619). In other words: exhibiting reasoning biases does not imply that one lacks the
capacity to reason rationally, only that exercising that capacity will require effort to
overcome or suppress those biases.
As seen, people with delusions exhibit several reasoning biases (including attribu-
tion biases, the tendency to jump to conclusions, and a bias towards observational ad-
equacy) to a greater extent than control subjects (Broome et al. 2007, Garety and Free-
man 1999, McKay 2012). To respond to evidence, they will need to suppress these bi-
ases, which is cognitively effortful and requires motivation. Indeed, training subjects
to identify such cognitive biases in their thinking, and to come up with strategies for
avoiding them (metacognitive training), is an effective treatment for delusions (Moritz
and Woodward 2007, Moritz et al. 2014). This indicates that such cognitive biases are
a factor in delusion maintenance, functioning as masks on evidence-responsiveness
capacities. And it indicates that these are not permanent masks, but can be removed
with sufficient effort and motivation, allowing patients to successfully exercise their
evidence-responsiveness capacities.
In sum, we have reason to think that subjects with delusions have the capacity
to respond to counter-evidence on their delusion (§3.2). This capacity can be masked
by continued strange experiences, motivational factors, and cognitive biases, in which
case the delusion stays in place, or does not sufficiently change, in the face of counter-
evidence (§3.3). However, when they employ that capacity in the absence of masking
factors, the result is a rationally permissible change of mind in response to the ev-
idence. This is what we see when subjects become less confident in the content of
their delusion in the face of counter-evidence, when CBT succeeds, and in cases of
evidence-responsive remission more generally.
4 Implications of the View that Delusions are Evidence-
Responsive
4.1 Implications for the anti-responsiveness and anti-doxasticism
arguments
The claim that delusions are evidence-responsive bears directly on the debate on the
nature of delusions and belief outlined in §2. As we saw there, both proponents of
the Anti-Responsiveness and Anti-Doxasticism arguments hold that delusions are in-
tractable, that is, not evidence-responsive, and rely on this claim as a central argu-
mentative hinge. The discussion in §3 shows that this view is false: delusions are
evidence-responsive. We can therefore simultaneously hold the two following views:
The Evidence-Responsiveness View of Belief : Belief is constitutively
evidence-responsive, i.e. if 𝑆 believes that 𝑝, then 𝑆 has the capacity to
rationally respond to evidence bearing on 𝑝.
Doxasticism: Delusions are beliefs.
20
It follows that the Anti-Responsiveness Argument does not go through: delu-
sions do not provide a counterexample to the claim that belief is constitutively
evidence-responsive. Similarly, the Anti-Doxasticism Argument fails: the evidence-
responsiveness of beliefs does not militate against the claim that delusions are beliefs.
We can have our evidence-responsive cake and eat it too.
One might argue that this is too quick—for two reasons. The first has to do with
the scope of the claim that delusions are evidence-responsive: to dissolve the debate I
would need to show conclusively that all delusions are evidence-responsive, and I have
not done so. The second has to do with the sense of evidence-responsiveness at stake:
participants in the initial debate, this objector claims, meant evidence-responsiveness
in a stronger sense. I will consider these in turn.
First, the scope objection. As I mentioned at the beginning of §3, I cannot de-
cisively show that all delusions are evidence-responsive, but only make an induc-
tive case for that claim by considering data on a wide range of delusions. However,
given delusional heterogeneity (in etiology, accompanying diagnoses, degree of cir-
cumscription, and content, among others), the worry remains that the results I present
do not generalize to all delusions. Now, suppose that I have established that many
or most delusions are evidence-responsive, but that there remain some that are not.
Why not think that the very same debate arises again for this smaller subset of in-
tractable delusions, with the Anti-Responsiveness side arguing that they provide a
counterexample to the view that belief is constitutively evidence-responsive and the
Anti-Doxasticism side arguing that they are not beliefs? And, if so, how does my
argument in §3 help with this debate?²⁹
Against this, given that I present data supporting the evidence-responsiveness
of delusions with a wide range of different contents, degrees, and kinds of circum-
scription, and accompanied by a range of different psychiatric diagnoses, I think that
we can legitimately conclude (through an inductive argument) that all delusions are
evidence-responsive. Delusional heterogeneity in actual evidence-responsiveness is
the result of different masks on evidence-responsiveness capacities.
Of course, the claim that all delusions are evidence-responsive relies on an induc-
tive argument, so there may be delusions to which these findings do not generalize.
But the burden of proof is on the opponent to present such cases. In other words,
it is not clear if there is space left for the same debate to arise over a smaller subset
of delusions. There is, to be sure, space for debates about how to classify imaginary
cases, and to use thought experiments to probe the limits of belief. But this is a differ-
ent debate, one that runs parallel to debates on delusions. This paper is not meant to
refute every possible counter-example to the evidence-responsiveness view of belief
resulting from thought experiments.
But let’s grant the objector that there are some intractable delusions. It is not
clear that this would generate the same debate we saw. This is because few if any
doxasticists hold that all delusions are beliefs: for instance, as Elisabeth Pacherie and
Tim Bayne note, they “certainly do not intend to argue that all delusional states are
beliefs” (Bayne and Pacherie 2005, 179). For this reason, it is not clear that doxasticists
would feel compelled to claim that these marginal cases are beliefs and use them to
29. Thanks to Christopher Willard-Kyle for pressing me on this point.
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argue against the evidence-responsiveness view of belief. Indeed, the existing debate
in the literature focuses precisely on the kinds of cases I consider in §3, so it is fair
to say that my discussion in that section advances the debate by showing that those
are cases where we detect evidence-responsiveness (against the assumption made by
both sides).
The second objection is that, in claiming that delusions are evidence-responsive in
the capacities sense articulated in §3.1, I have just changed the subject. Participants
in the initial debate meant something else by “evidence-responsiveness”, namely, ra-
tionally responding to counter-evidence most of the time, and it is no resolution of
the debate to change the topic.
In response, grant that many participants in the debate spell out evidence-
responsiveness along such lines. Most explicitly, Lisa Bortolotti’s arguments (in
Bortolotti (2005a), Bortolotti (2005b), and Bortolotti (2009)) have as their target what
she calls “the background view” of rationality constraints on belief, according to
which belief requires an overall background of rationality. On the background view,
“if deviations from norms of rationality are too widespread, then the ascription of
beliefs is compromised” (Bortolotti 2005a, 20). Applying this view of rationality
constraints to evidence-responsiveness, her target is the view that people rationally
respond to counter-evidence on their beliefs most of the time.
I agree that we ought to reject this view. As Bortolotti (2009) notes, we do not even
need to appeal to delusions to establish this point. We often fail to rationally revise
many ordinary beliefs—including political beliefs, beliefs one cherishes, and prosaic
beliefs about the goodness of our own everyday decisions—in the face of counter-
evidence.³⁰
However, this does not settle things in favor of the Anti-Responsiveness side. Pro-
ponents of the Anti-Responsiveness Argument take themselves to be attacking the
most promising version of a connection between evidence-responsiveness and be-
lief.³¹ If I am right, then they are not attacking the most promising version of this
idea. The version I propose is more promising, given that, unlike the ones they con-
sider, it can accommodate data on delusion maintenance and provides a framework in
which to theorize about the interaction between evidence-responsiveness, perceptual
experience, motivational factors, and cognitive biases.
Similarly, proponents of the Anti-Doxasticism Argument aim to “protect the idea
of essentially rational belief from attack;”(Currie and Jureidini 2001, 161), and not
specifically the idea that beliefs adjust to the evidence in rational ways most of the
time. The appeal to capacities for evidence-responsiveness offers a new tool to defend
that general idea. The Evidence-Responsiveness View of Belief, spelled out in terms
of capacities, makes belief essentially rational in the sense that it is part of the nature
of belief that beliefs are underwritten by evidence-responsiveness capacities; in other
words, that, in the absence of interfering factors, beliefs are rationally updated in
response to counter-evidence. This is compatible with a range of powerful interfering
factors to such updating, as we saw in §3.3. For this reason, as I argued in §3, belief
being essentially rational in this sense is compatible with delusions being beliefs.
30. See Mandelbaum (2019) for compelling defense of this claim.
31. Indeed, sometimes they explicitly consider other versions of the idea. See Bortolotti 2009, 18–21.
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The notion of evidence-responsiveness I propose therefore allows us to make com-
patible two attractive and otherwise jointly untenable positions: the traditional view
that there is some connection between believing and rationally responding to evi-
dence, and the claim that delusions are beliefs. This dissolves the debate we saw in §2,
which hinges on the claim that delusions are not evidence-responsive. And it opens
the door to holding that delusions are evidence-responsive beliefs.
As discussed in §2, the doxastic conception of delusions has many advantages.
Centrally, the doxastic view does justice to intuitive and clinical classifications of
delusions as beliefs, respects the continuity between non-delusional beliefs and delu-
sions, and accounts for the value of ascribing delusional beliefs in explaining patients’
behavior. These advantages are preserved in a view that claims that delusions are
evidence-responsive beliefs.
Though I favor the view that delusions are evidence-responsive beliefs, this can be
seen as an optional add-on tomy central claim in this paper, namely, that delusions are
evidence-responsive. You can accept that claim while rejecting a doxastic analysis of
delusions. Delusions might fail to be beliefs because they fail to meet other necessary
conditions on belief, such as characteristic connections to action, inference, and affect.
This is more than a bare possibility: there are standing debates on whether delusions
meet such necessary conditions on belief.³²
Independently of how such debates turn out, and of whether we ultimately ought
to classify delusions as beliefs, showing that the Evidence-Responsiveness View of
Belief does not rule out classifying delusions as beliefs is significant. It dissolves a
long-standing debate in the literature. And it shows that the Evidence-Responsiveness
View of Belief need not be overly rationalist, or require us to idealize beliefs. Evidence-
responsiveness is compatible with the pervasive interference of non-rational factors,
to an extent that can lead to delusion.
4.2 Implications for the study of delusion and belief maintenance
In §3, I argued that delusions are underwritten by evidence-responsiveness capacities
that can be masked in a range of ways, including by abnormal perceptual experiences,
motivational factors, and cognitive biases. This involved surveying and piecing to-
gether a wide range of empirical literature on delusions. One can view the result as
an an integrated framework on which to think about delusion maintenance. Instead
of, for example, seeing views that focus on how delusions are responsive to evidence
(Maher 1974) as competitors to views that center motivational influences (like tradi-
tional psychodynamic views), we can factor in contributions of these different factors
into a single model.
This paper provides only a framework, not a full model that can make concrete
predictions about the maintenance of specific delusions. As our empirical understand-
32. My argument in this paper suggests a novel argumentative strategy for dealing with these debates. In-
stead of asking whether subjects with delusions act, infer, and feel in belief-characteristic ways most of
the time, we should investigate whether subjects with delusions have the relevant capacities (e.g. for
acting on a belief, drawing inferences from it, and experiencing corresponding emotional reactions). Fo-
cusing on capacities is a promising strategy for accommodating pervasive irrationality on the one hand,
and theoretical and practical roles that belief is called upon to play on the other. Exploring this possibility
is beyond the scope of this paper.
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ing of the contribution of different factors to delusion maintenance grows, we might
be able to construct a detailed model, one which assigns weights to these different
factors for specific delusions, helping us understand the causal mechanisms behind
delusion maintenance and yielding recommendations for interventions that are likely
to lead to delusion remission in specific cases.
The framework I propose may also help us understand belief maintenance,
not just delusion maintenance. If one embraces the orthodox view that belief is
constitutively evidence-responsive, then beliefs are in the province of evidence-
responsiveness capacities—as are delusions. Further, the masking factors to which I
appealed to explain delusional evidence-resistance (non-veridical perception, moti-
vational factors, and cognitive biases) also apply to beliefs. This suggests that beliefs
and delusions are regulated by at least some of the same cognitive mechanisms.
Consequently, if my view of delusions is right, we can look to delusions to better
understand beliefs, and vice-versa. This fits with the methodology of cognitive neu-
ropsychiatry, which uses data from “people with acquired disorders of cognition to
constrain, develop, and test theories of normal cognitive structures and processes”
(Davies and Davies 2009, 288), and models of normal cognition to investigate the
causes of such disorders.³³
This approach has been successfully applied to the study of delusion formation.
It underlies the account of Capgras formation discussed in §3.3, which relies on com-
paring Capgras patients’ responses to faces to a model of normal face recognition
(Ellis and Young 1990). Building on such work, two-factor theorists of delusions (who
think that there is an additional factor on top of perceptual abnormalities involved in
delusion formation and maintenance) have approached delusion formation and main-
tenance through comparisons with our best models of such processes in subjects with-
out delusions (Stone and Young 1997, Davies and Coltheart 2000, Davies and Davies
2009, Coltheart 2007, Coltheart et al. 2011). The framework that emerges from see-
ing delusions as evidence-responsive can be seen as a contribution to this research
project.
4.3 Implications for treatment
The view that delusions are evidence-responsive in the capacities sense has impli-
cations for treatment. Specifically, it encourages us to take seriously the view that
offering counter-evidence to the delusion—when conditions for getting the patient
to exercise their evidence-responsiveness capacities are in place—is a promising path
to delusion remission. In practical terms, the advice is to invest more in cognitive-
behavioral therapy coupled with interventions that remove masking factors.
This fits current treatment practices. As seen in §3.2, cognitive-behavioral ther-
apy is recommended for delusions. Further, within cognitive-behavioral therapy, at-
33. There is substantial unclarity about what normality consists in: is it the statistically normal case (here,
of belief maintenance)? The case where the systems involved in belief maintenance meet their function,
whatever that may be? The case that satisfies norms of rationality? This is an important unresolved
methodological question in cognitive neuropsychiatry. I am here just assuming that there is some thin
(non-moral) notion of normality that allows us to study the functioning and malfunctioning of cognitive
mechanisms. Thanks to August Gorman for discussion.
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tention is given to ensuring that background conditions for the patient to respond
to evidence are in place. For instance, cognitive-behavioral therapy includes build-
ing a relationship of trust between the patient and therapist, without which it is un-
likely to be effective (Greene 2005). Trust is a condition for the patient to accept the
evidence the therapist provides, and it reduces the likelihood of defensive reactions
to it. In other words, it increases the likelihood that the patient will exercise their
evidence-responsiveness capacities without the interference of motivational factors
that manifest themselves in defensive reactions.³⁴
There is growing recognition of the role of motivational factors in mediating the
effectiveness of CBT. Specifically, when patients respond defensively to their delu-
sions being directly challenged—a clear sign of the influence of motivational factors
via cognitive dissonance—CBT is unlikely to succeed. In such cases, meta-cognitive
therapy (discussed in §3.3) is recommended. Meta-cognitive therapy takes a ‘back-
door’ approach, not directly addressing the delusion but instead enabling the patient
to do so at a later stage (Moritz and Woodward 2007), in a way that avoids motiva-
tional factors taking up such a large role in responding to the evidence. In addition
to setting up the stage for interacting with evidence in a way that puts less weight on
motivational factors, meta-cognitive therapy trains patients to avoid common reason-
ing biases. As such, it can be understood as removing masks of a non-motivational
kind, namely, reasoning biases.
Finally, antipsychotic medication can be understood as operating on perceptual
masks on the patient’s evidence-responsiveness capacities. It primarily operates on
the patient’s dopaminergetic neurotransmission (Gardner et al. 2005). As seen in §3.3,
abnormal perceptual experiences caused by dopamine deregulation, which affects per-
ceptual salience, are one of the factors that explain delusionmaintenance in the face of
counter-evidence. Antipsychotic medication operates on this masking factor through
regulating dopamine transmission.
In addition to helping account for current treatment practices, the view that delu-
sions are evidence-responsive helps de-stigmatize delusions, which is important for
successful treatment. Delusions are not bizarre attitudes outside the space of reasons,
or which place patients into a realm apart from people without psychosis. Instead,
they are the result of (heightened forms of) cognitive, motivational, and perceptual fac-
tors that also cause and maintain ordinary beliefs. Normalizing and reducing stigma
increases treatment motivation in patients (Lüllmann and Lincoln 2013). My view
suggests that de-stigmatizing delusions is not merely practically helpful in treatment,
but is also accurate to the cognitive mechanisms behind delusions.
4.4 Ethical implications
As the point about stigma foreshadows, the view that delusions are evidence-
responsive beliefs has important ethical upshots. Delusions are often treated as
grounds on which to exclude people from the moral and epistemic community. The
view that delusions are evidence-responsive offers tools to argue that such exclusion
is inappropriate, and not just for moral reasons.
34. For more on the role of disturbances in trust and communication in the maintenance of delusions, see
Fuchs (2015) and Fuchs (2020).
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The justification for excluding people with delusions from the moral and epis-
temic community goes something like this. People with delusions are unmoored from
shared reality, beyond the reach of reasons or evidence. At least insofar as the delu-
sion is concerned, there is no point attempting to rationally engage with them. Fur-
ther, the strangeness and tenacity of many delusions easily make it easy to slip into
thinking that there is something so deeply wrong that attempting to rationally engage
on any topic is unwarranted. As a result, a kind of blanket objectifying treatment
comes to cover all interactions with the patient.
In this view, a person with delusions is properly treated in the objective stance, as
an object to be handled as opposed to a person to reason with. Indeed, people with
delusions have been taken to be paradigmatic candidates for the objective stance. As
Strawson noted in introducing the concept of the objective stance, seeing an agent
“as one whose picture of the world is an insane delusion…tends to inhibit ordinary
interpersonal attitudes in general, and the kind of demand and expectation which
those attitudes involve; and tends to promote instead the purely objective view of the
agent as one posing problems simply of intellectual understanding, management, and
control”(Strawson 1974, 16–17).
Now, one may think the objective stance is appropriate given the kind of attitude
delusions are, yet oppose taking it up based on ethical considerations. For example,
one may object to this treatment because it is disrespectful, or because marginaliz-
ing and stigmatizing people with delusions makes their lives worse and reduces the
chances of delusion remission, while holding that people with delusions are outside
the space of reasons, at least insofar as the delusion is concerned. This position makes
adopting a non-objective stance toward people with delusions a useful fiction.
In contrast, my view of delusions implies that it is taking up the objective stance
that is grounded in a (pernicious) fiction. It is not that it is morally better to act as
if people with delusions are within the reach of reasons. They genuinely are within
the reach of reasons. In other words, my view reconstitutes how it is appropriate to
look at people with delusions, and opens up space for attitudes “of involvement or
participation in a human relationship”(Strawson 1974, 9).
There is substantive debate about what these attitudes look like in the case of
severe mental illness. The traditional Strawsonian view upholds a dichotomy between
the objective stance and the participant stance, where the participant stance includes
blame and resentment (in addition to attitudes such as “gratitude, forgiveness, anger,
or the sort of love which two adults can sometimes be said to feel reciprocally, for each
other”(Strawson 1974, 9)). However, perhaps blame and resentment are inappropriate
in the case of delusions. Philosophers of psychiatry have challenged the claim that it
is appropriate to blame patients while rejecting the view that we ought to shift into
the objective stance. This can be achieved in two main ways: either by severing the
participant stance and the appropriateness of blame (Pickard and Ward 2013, Pickard
2015) or by introducing new non-objective stances, such as “the nurturing stance”
(Brandenburg 2018).³⁵
Outlining precisely what attitudes are appropriate in the case of delusions is be-
yond the scope of this paper. The key point for my purposes is that the objective
35. Thanks to Sofia Jeppsson for bringing the nurturing stance to my attention.
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stance is not appropriate given the nature of the delusion, against the standard view
outlined above. In particular, at least some attitudes and ways of interacting that fall
sharply outside the objective stance, such as reasoning with someone and holding
them to normative standards for how they ought to respond, are appropriate.
The fact that there is space for such attitudes does not on its own imply that we
ought, all things considered, to take them up in every interaction. This is a famil-
iar point. Taking up the objective stance is “a resource” we use “as a refuge…from
the strains of involvement; or as an aid to policy; or simply out of intellectual cu-
riosity”(Strawson 1974, 9–10). This is true in interacting with anyone, not just with
people with delusions. In the latter case, the strains of involvement may prove them-
selves more burdensome, so that taking up the objective stance when interacting on
the topic of the delusion may still often be the better option.
As the point above illustrates, the question of what stance to take up when inter-
acting with people with delusions in specific circumstances is a difficult one. Ad-
dressing it would require taking into account many factors beyond the evidence-
responsiveness of the delusion. Nevertheless, establishing that there is room for tak-
ing up a non-objective stance when interacting on the topic of the delusion is signif-
icant, especially given the marginalization, exclusion, and stigmatization that comes
with the objective stance.³⁶
5 Conclusion
Delusions have been taken to pose a hard challenge for the orthodox view that belief
is constitutively evidence-responsive. They are typically classified as beliefs, yet they
are deeply evidence-resistant, seeming to constitute a counterexample to the orthodox
view. In the opposite direction, proponents of the orthodox view have argued that the
deep evidence-resistance of delusions implies that they cannot be beliefs.
Against this, I appealed to empirical evidence on delusions and their remission to
argue that delusions are evidence-responsive in the sense that people with delusions
have the capacity to rationally respond to evidence bearing on their delusions. Their
extreme evidence-resistance is a consequence of masking factors on these capacities
such as strange perceptual experiences, motivational factors, and cognitive biases.
Once we see that delusions are evidence-responsive, we can dissolve the apparent
tension between the view that delusions are beliefs and the evidence-responsiveness
view of belief. Further, the claim that delusions are evidence-responsive yields a uni-
fied framework on which to study delusions and belief updating, and has significant
implications both for treatment and for how to interact with patients with delusions.
36. Thanks to August Gorman for helpful discussion of the ethical implications of the view.
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